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AGAINST PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY:





A highly revisionary reading of Descartes’ epistemology is beginning
to emerge in the literature on Descartes’ ethics. Some commenta-
tors have argued that Descartes ascribes to passionate epistemology,
which claims that epistemic progress in the Meditations requires moral
progress—in particular, the regulation of the passions. I argue that on
a plausible understanding of the cognitive nature of the passions—
namely, a motivationalist reading—the passions cannot and ought not
do any major or minor epistemic work in the Meditations. Thus, while
the presence of the passions in the Meditations is interesting and de-
serving of our attention, they do not require us to revise our canon-
ical understanding of the Meditations as an exercise of pure thought.
Furthermore, we need not abandon the standard claim that ethical
practice emerges in the tree of philosophy only after metaphysics and
epistemology have been established.
In the famous tree of philosophy passage (French Preface to the Principles,
AT IXB: 14/CSM I: 186),1 Descartes implies that the highest branch and the
fruit of the tree (ethics), is systematically related to the roots (metaphysics
and epistemology), the trunk (physics), and the other branches of the tree
(medicine and mechanics):2
1I employ the following abbreviations for editions of Descartes’ work: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de
Descartes (cited by volume and page), Adam and Tannery (1996); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes (cited by volume and page), Cottingham et al. (1985); ‘CSMK’: The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes (cited by page), Cottingham et al. (1991).
2Author’s illustration. See Ariew (1992) and Morgan (1994) for in depth analysis of
the tree of philosophy.
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Fig. 1: l’Arbre de Philosophie
There are two interpretive camps on the systematic nature of Cartesian
ethics. On the epistemological reading, the tree represents a strict epistemo-
logical order of discovery: one must first know metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy before moving on to physics, mechanics, and so forth (Marshall 1998,
2–4, 72– 74, 59–60; Morgan 1994, 204–211; Parvizian 2016, Rutherford
2004, 190). On the organic reading, however, all parts of the tree grow si-
multaneously from its roots. Ethics, then, is involved in metaphysics and
epistemology (Shapiro 2008a, Rodis-Lewis 1987, Schmitter 2002, Morgan
1994).
There are a number of commentators who have—either implicitly or
explicitly—argued that ethics is at the foundation of Descartes’ system
(Boehm 2014, Naaman-Zauderer 2010, Rodis-Lewis 1987, Schmitter 2002,
Shapiro 2005, 2008). One interpretation is particularly noteworthy. Lisa
Shapiro (2005) has argued—or at least suggested—that the Meditations is
designed to regulate the meditator’s passions through the acquisition of the
passion and virtue of generosity in the Fourth Meditation. The meditator’s
epistemic progress goes hand in hand with her moral progress.
Shapiro notes the revisionary implications of such a view. If correct, a
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thorough re-interpretation of Descartes’ epistemology would be in order.
The canonical view is that the meditator’s epistemic progress is a matter of
pure thought, and that it does not depend on any faculties or content that
have corporeal origins (e.g. sensations and passions). It is the meditator’s
reliance on the natural light or the intellect—and of course corresponding
affirmations of the will—which leads to scientia (see, e.g., Loeb 1990, Nel-
son 2005, Vinci 1998, Williams 1978). Call this RATIONALIST EPISTEMOL-
OGY. But if the passions—i.e. passive emotions or feelings that are (gener-
ally) practically oriented and have physiological origins—play an epistemic
role in the Meditations, RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY is more than suspect:
“Knowing involves not only having one’s thoughts in order but also having
one’s feelings in order” (2005: 30). Shapiro is suggesting that the passions
have some intrinsic role in the meditator’s acquisition of scientia. Bracket-
ing the details for now, call this PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY.
In service of the standard epistemological reading of Cartesian system-
aticity, Parvizian (2016) has argued that the meditator is not in an epis-
temic position to acquire and exercise generosity in the Fourth Medita-
tion. But strictly speaking, Parvizian’s argument left untouched the cata-
log of passions expressed in the Meditations (Shapiro 2005; cf. Beardsley
2005, Schmitter 2002, 2005). An objector might concede that the medita-
tor cannot acquire generosity, and consequently, that she cannot regulate
her passions vis-à-vis generosity. But she may nonetheless push back: Can
the meditator regulate her passions—vis-à-vis some other means—over the
course of the Meditations? And are these regulated passions epistemically
significant? In short, while Parvizian may have shown that moral virtue
does not enter into the Meditations, the truth of PASSIONATE EPISTEMOL-
OGY—and the nature of Cartesian systematicity with respect to ethics more
generally—is still up in the air.
To be sure, PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY—understood as an independent
philosophical thesis—requires further examination. However, PASSIONATE
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EPISTEMOLOGY—understood as a Cartesian thesis—must be ultimately re-
jected. Descartes’ fundamental epistemological commitments, coupled with
the methodology of the Meditations precludes any real epistemic role for
the passions in the Meditations. Admittedly, some minor concessions must
be made. It is an obvious truth that the meditator must have some passions
in order to make epistemic progress. For example, the meditator must have
a desire—indeed a strong desire—for knowledge such that she is motivated
to continue beyond the First Meditation, and not just throw her hands up
and remain a skeptic. But that is not really interesting, for it does not put
direct pressure on RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY. Sure, the meditator must
have a desire for knowledge, but that in no way entails that this desire is
relevant to a given epistemic achievement. What would be interesting is if
this desire (or any other passion) were essential to the success of a specific
argument or cognitive exercise that terminates in scientia or even a mere
conceptual clarification.
There are, broadly speaking, two interpretations of the cognitive na-
ture of Cartesian passions: the motivationalist reading and the representa-
tionalist reading. The motivationalist reading claims that the passions are
merely motivational in that they are purely affective states with no inten-
tional content (Brassfield 2012, Greenberg 2007). The representationalist
reading claims that the passions are motivational, but that they are also
intentional as well: they have representational content (see, e.g, Alanen
2003, Brown 2006, Clarke 2005, Franco 2015, 2016, Hatfield 2007). I will
not adjudicate between these readings. However, I will also not consider
a representationalist reading of the meditator’s passions. This is because
Descartes and his commentators are abundantly clear that the passions are
obscure and confused, and on any plausible reading of what the passions
represent (i.e. mostly bodily goods and harms), they simply cannot be rele-
vant to the project of the Meditations. The best bet here is a motivationalist
reading—indeed, this is the kind of reading Shapiro proposes. If PASSION-
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ATE EPISTEMOLOGY is true, then the passions must motivate the meditator
in the right kinds of ways such that she makes epistemic progress.
In section 2, I explain Shapiro’s motivationalist reading of the passions
in the Meditations. In section 3, I argue for the following conditional: if
the passions are motivational, then PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is false.3 In
section 4, I discuss some potential outliers, namely, the status of the medi-
tator’s intellectual wonder and joy that is directed at her clear and distinct
perception of God. In section 5, I offer my final response to Shapiro. As
we will see, matters are complicated. Although Descartes has principled
reasons to exclude the passions from the search for truth, Shapiro is right
that having one’s passions in order is relevant to a particular kind of knowl-
edge, namely, self-knowledge. But that self-knowledge—the legitimate self-
esteem involved in the first component of generosity—can only be attained
once the Meditations is dispassionately completed.
1 Against PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY
The central Shapiro piece that I am responding to (2005), clearly assumes a
motivationalist reading of the passions—nowhere does Shapiro claim that
the passions represent, and every relevant function of the passions in the
Meditations that she describes must be cashed out in terms of motivation.
Admittedly, Shapiro does not make that fully explicit. To complicate mat-
ters, Shapiro now clearly ascribes to a representationalist reading of the
passions (2012). But that is irrelevant for the counterargument at hand. I
am already bracketing a representationalist reading of the meditator’s pas-
sions, as I assume that such a view simply cannot work. Moreover, even if
Shapiro has abandoned the motivationalist reading, there are other com-
mentators who do ascribe to a motivationalist reading. Thus, as applied to
3I assume, for the purposes of this paper, that the following conditional is true: if the
passions are representational, then PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is false.
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the meditator’s passions, it deserves our attention.
1.1 The Motivationalist Reading
Let us first get a handle on the claim that the passions are merely mo-
tivational. The motivationalist reading claims that the passions are non-
intentional, affective states. Their function is merely to motivate subjects.
As Descartes writes in Passions II.52:
I observe, moreover, that the objects which stimulate the senses
do not excite different passions in us because of differences in
the objects, but only because of the various ways in which they
may harm or benefit us or in general have importance for us.
The function of all the passions consists solely in this, that they
dispose our soul to want the things which nature deems useful
for us, and to persist in this volition; and the same agitation of
the spirits which normally causes the passions also disposes the
body to make movements which help us to attain these things.
(AT XI: 372/CSM I: 349, cf. Passions I.40, AT XI: 359/CSM I:
343).
Descartes claims that the function of the passions is to dispose the soul to
want the things which nature deems useful for the mind-body composite,
and to also dispose the body to move in the appropriate ways so as to at-
tain those things. As Sean Greenberg puts it, “the function of the passions
is in some way to dispose the soul to contribute to actions that serve to pre-
serve the body” (Greenberg 20087: 723; see also Radner 2003). The way
in which the passions dispose the soul is by being motivational (Ibid. 715).
How exactly that plays out will depend on the kind of passion in question.
For example, fear motivates the soul to flee and courage motivates the soul
to fight (Passions I.40, AT XI: 359/CSM I: 343).
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Note that, on the motivationalist reading, the function assigned to the
passions is similar, but slightly different than the one assigned to sensa-
tions in the Sixth Meditation (Greenberg 2007: 717-7). There, Descartes
assigns a biological function to sensations: “the proper purpose of the sen-
sory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform [significandum]
the mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the
mind is a part” (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 83/CSM II: 57). Insofar as sen-
sations inform, many have argued that sensations must have representa-
tional content (De Rosa 2007, Hatfield 2013, Simmons 1999; cf. Gottlieb
& Parvizian). But given Descartes’ strict distinction between sensations and
passions (Passions I.27, AT XI: 349/CSM I: 338-9), it seems that passions
and sensations have distinct sub-roles that work in concert to preserve the
health and well-being of the mind-body composite. The function of a sen-
sation is to inform the soul of what is beneficial or harmful for it while the
function of a passion is to motivate the soul to achieve what is beneficial or
harmful for it.
1.2 PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY in the Meditations
There are many nitty gritty details that must be addressed to unpack fully
the motivationalist reading. But I think we have enough on the table to ex-
amine a motivationalist reading of the passions in the Meditations. As I see
it, Shapiro needs to substantiate the following claim to defend PASSIONATE
EPISTEMOLOGY:
EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT PASSION: There exists some passion, P, that
directly motivates the meditator into a major epistemic achievement (e.g. the
attainment of an item of scientia) or a minor epistemic achievement (e.g. a
conceptual clarification).
Indeed, this is exactly what Shapiro aims to do. Let us turn, then, to her
narrative of the meditator’s passions.
7
1.2.1 Shapiro on the Meditator’s Passions
Though many readers might have never noticed the meditator’s passions,
a close reading confirms that the meditator expresses a range of passions
throughout her search for truth. According to Shapiro, these are not dis-
connected expressions of passion. Rather, the trajectory of the meditator’s
passions indicates that “the meditator changes how he feels about things
over the course of the Meditations” (2005: 24); in particular, the meditator’s
feelings about skepticism are transformed.4
The First Meditation begins with the meditator’s desire [cupiam] (Pas-
sions II.86) to establish something stable and lasting in the sciences (AT
VII: 17/CSM II: 12). In pursuing this desire for knowledge, the meditator
engages the well-known series of skeptical arguments that ultimately un-
dermine her body of beliefs. Faced with skepticism, the meditator is in a
state of fear [timet] and apprehension [vereor] (AT VII: 23/CSM II: 15; cf.
Passions II. 59, III.174).
At this point, the meditator must either choose to continue her pursuit
of knowledge (and thus run the risk of embracing skepticism), or to aban-
don it and return to the “pleasant illusion” that her pre-meditative beliefs
are well-founded (Shapiro 2005: 24). Either way, “there is ground for trep-
idation” (Ibid.). The meditator accepts the risk of the first option, but by
the end of the Sixth Meditation skepticism no longer has a disruptive effect
on the meditator’s emotional life. Instead, the meditator confidently laughs
(Passions II.124-6) skepticism away: “the exaggerated doubts of the last
few days should be dismissed as laughable [risu dignae]” (AT VII: 89/CSM
II: 61). Shapiro contends that if we are to take the meditator’s passions
seriously (i.e. not reduce their presence to stylistic accident or rhetorical
flourish), this drastic change in passion requires some explanation (2005:
4In what follows, I shall primarily focus on the passions immediately related to the
meditator’s pursuit of knowledge, as these are directly relevant to Shapiro’s account of
Motivationalist PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY. Shapiro, however, catalogs a variety of other
passions that the meditator undergoes (2005: 15-8).
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18-23).
Here is an epistemological explanation that might tempt some readers:
the meditator’s laughter is merely a trivial symptom of her having de-
feated skepticism through proving the existence of mind, God, and body.
This would fall in line with Descartes’ general solution for regulating the
passions, namely, to make the passions subject to true knowledge (see,
e.g., Passions II. AT XI: 436/CSM I: 379). Shapiro contends, however, that
metaphysical knowledge alone cannot render skepticism laughable, be-
cause there is a significant sense in which the meditator remains vulnerable
to skeptical scenarios. Part of the reason why skepticism originally led the
meditator to fear and apprehension was the possibility that she might have
a defective nature. Yet in the Sixth Meditation, the meditator learns that
she cannot fully rule out this possibility, for her constitution qua mind-body
union is susceptible to sensory deception and even true errors of nature
(AT VII: 85/CSM II: 59; AT VII: 88/CSM II: 61). Strictly speaking, then,
the meditator fully armed with the inventory of Cartesian metaphysics can
still intelligibly regenerate skeptical scenarios. Hence one might expect the
meditator to despair once again when the possibility of deception and error
is reconsidered at the end of the Sixth Meditation. Instead, we find that the
meditator’s
Thoughts about the weakness of his own nature are no longer
invested with the same passions. What once made him fearful
now makes him laugh; he feels differently about things. (2005:
25)
Therefore an appeal to metaphysical knowledge alone cannot explain the
meditator’s laughter.
1.2.2 Shapiro on the Meditator’s Generosity
Shapiro proposes the following explanation: the meditator feels differently
about skepticism because she has regulated her desire for knowledge through
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acquiring the passion and virtue of generosity. The desire for knowledge
that initiated the First Meditation was actually excessive: the meditator
hoped to “never make a mistake again” (2005: 26). This is evidenced by the
meditator’s plan to “hold back my assent from opinions which are not com-
pletely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which
are patently false” (First Meditation, AT VII: 18/CSM II: 12). Thus, when
the skeptical arguments reveal her weaknesses, the meditator despairs for
she may be incapable of satisfying her desire for knowledge. But in the
last line of the Sixth Meditation, we find the meditator acknowledging her
limitations: “in this human life we are often liable to make mistakes about
particular things, and we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature”
(AT VII: 90/CSM II: 62). This indicates that the meditator has transitioned
from desiring absolute certainty in all of her beliefs to desiring to know that
which she can know, and this is the key to fully defeating skepticism.
Generosity is well-suited to this task because it is the “general remedy
for all disorders of the passions,” in particular vain desires (Passions III.161,
AT XI: 454/CSM I: 388). Shapiro has two reasons for reading generosity
into the Fourth Meditation. First, the Fourth Meditation seems to exemplify
Descartes’s proposed method for acquiring generosity:
According to Descartes, one ‘may excite in oneself the passion
and then acquire the virtue of generosity’ just by frequently con-
sidering ‘what free will is and how great the advantages are that
come from a firm resolution to use it well.’ (Shapiro 1999: 252)
Indeed, the Fourth Meditation seems to involve such considerations. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, Shapiro reads the meditator as actually acquir-
ing generosity. Descartes defines generosity as follows:
[T]rue generosity, which causes a person’s self-esteem to be as
great as it may legitimately be, has only two components. The
first consists in his knowing that nothing truly belongs to him
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but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to
be praised or blamed for no other reason than his using this
freedom well or badly. The second consists in his feeling within
himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well—that is,
never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he
judges to be best. To do that is to pursue virtue in a perfect
manner. (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-446/CSM I: 384)
Shapiro argues that, in the Fourth Meditation, the meditator acquires both
components proper to generosity—“the recognition on each of our parts
that we have a free will, paired with the resolution to use our will well”
(2005: 28)—through learning the method for avoiding error, and then re-
solving to adhere to the method.
Descartes explains that generosity remedies vain desires by demarcat-
ing the things that are within one’s power or freedom to acquire from those
which are not, thus leading one to value only those things whose acquisi-
tion depends on one’s capacities (Passions III.156, AT XI: 448/CSM I: 385).
Shapiro suggests that we can see such a change effected in the now gen-
erous meditator. By the end of the Fourth Meditation, the meditator still
seeks the truth about fundamental reality, but she will not despair if she
cannot know something, for “it is in the nature of a finite intellect to lack
understanding of many things, and it is in the nature of a created intellect
to be finite” (AT VII: 60/CSM II: 42). Through recognizing her cognitive
weakness and vulnerability to error, the meditator combats the influences
of skepticism, and can even laugh at it. However, the meditator’s laughter
at the end of the Sixth Meditation is not only directed at the “hyperbole of
skeptical arguments”, but also at
Himself and his own excesses. His earlier aspirations to absolute
certainty amount to wanting a superhuman degree of knowl-
edge, and that desire was indeed ridiculous (2005: 30).
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Shapiro’s reading implies that generosity and the regulation of the pas-
sions contributes to both minor and major epistemic achievements, and
thus if right, would substantiate EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT PASSION. By
regulating the meditator’s excessive desire for knowledge, generosity effec-
tively leads the meditator to reconceive the aims of her metaphysical and
epistemological project (a conceptual clarification, and thus a minor epis-
temic achievement). If the meditator did not undergo this transformation—
instead sustaining her excessive desire for knowledge—she would have
failed in her search for truth. But more importantly, insofar as knowledge of
free will and adherence to the method for avoiding error amounts to gen-
erosity on Shapiro’s view, generosity is essential to the meditator’s success.
For it is through adhering to the method for avoiding error that the medi-
tator attains scientia of the real distinction between mind and body and the
existence of the material world—a major epistemic achievement (2008:
461). This is why Shapiro claims that generosity is the “key to Cartesian
metaphysics and epistemology”(Ibid. 459).
Parvizian (2016) has argued that generosity cannot be acquired in the
Fourth Meditation. But even if one accepts Parvizian’s argument, Shapiro’s
general narrative of the meditator’s passions remains—in some sense—
intact. The meditator’s passions still—at least prima facie—demand expla-
nation.
2 If the Passions are Motivational,
then PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is False
I will raise two arguments against Shapiro’s general narrative. First, I will
contend that the tempting epistemological explanation of the regulation
of the passions that Shapiro dismisses in passing—namely, that metaphys-
ical knowledge can account for the regulation of the passions—is actually
the most plausible explanation (if one wants to take the passions seri-
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ously). And once that explanation is fully fleshed out, it turns out that
the passions—in particular, the desire for knowledge and the laughter at
skepticism—are not doing any real epistemic work. Second, I will argue
that even though the meditator may experience passions, she must ignore
them given her commitment to the method of doubt.
2.1 The Epistemological Explanation Reconsidered
The fundamental regulation in the meditator’s passions, according to Shapiro,
is in reeling in the excessive desire for knowledge. This regulation allows
the meditator to transition from being in a state of dread and fear in the
face of skepticism, to eventually laughing it off:
At the beginning of the Meditations, the meditator seems to de-
sire absolute certainty about everything. His hope appears to be
to never make a mistake again. Thus, he does not find the dis-
tinction between opinions which are ‘patently false’ and those
which are not ‘completely certain and indubitable’ significant in
his quest for knowledge, for only if all his beliefs are true can he
hope to go forward from them to further beliefs and ultimately
to a body of knowledge. Yet by the end of the work, his desire
seems to be for something subtly different. He is still seeking the
truth, but he no longer demands to be assured that all his be-
liefs are true. In the last lines of the Meditations, the meditator
is reconciled to the commonsensical notion that the will makes
mistakes.
I contend that this is simply a false description of the meditator’s initial
desire for knowledge, and that this interpretive error is what leads to the
more general claim that the passions are regulated. Shapiro explicitly as-
cribes the following desire to the meditator in the First Meditation:
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EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC DESIRE: The meditator has a desire to raise all of her
beliefs to the status of scientia. (2005: 36)
Shapiro then explicitly ascribes the following desire to the meditator at the
end of the Sixth Meditation:
PROPER EPISTEMIC DESIRE: The meditator has a desire for all relevant and
possible scientia. (Ibid.)
While I see textual evidence for PROPER EPISTEMIC DESIRE throughout the
Meditations (not just in the Sixth Meditation), there simply is no textual
evidence for EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC DESIRE, that is, a text where the medi-
tator says she desires scientia about everything. Indeed, the initial premise
of the Meditations is that the meditator pre-theoretically realized that most
of her beliefs were false (First Meditation, AT VII: 17/CSM II: 12). Thus
it would be odd for the meditator to then desire, in the First Meditation,
to demonstrate that all of her pre-theoretical beliefs were actually true.
Shapiro seems to be mistaking Descartes’ high—and seemingly excessive—
standards for scientia in the First Meditation with EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC
DESIRE. That is:
SCIENTIA STANDARDS: A belief (or judgment) that p is scientia for a subject,
S iff S believes that p, p is true, & S has absolute certainty that p.5
Descartes does clearly ascribe—at least implicitly—to SCIENTIA STANDARDS
in the First Meditation. The task of the Meditations, then, is not to regulate
the desire for scientia, but rather to uphold faithfully SCIENTIA STANDARDS.
What would constitute hard evidence for EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC DESIRE
would be texts that show a consistent tug and pull between EXCESSIVE
EPISTEMIC DESIRE and SCIENTIA STANDARDS. That is, we would need at
least a few cases where the meditator explicitly says: ‘I do have scientia in
5For a full account of my interpretation of scientia, in particular the nature of absolute
certainty see (redacted).
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my judgment that p’ (where p is obscure and confused) but then she later
realizes that her ‘judgment that p does not meet the standards of scientia’.
If we were to see an abandonment of these specific kinds of epistemic mis-
takes, we might be able to say that the excesses in the meditator’s desire
for knowledge are eventually trimmed down. But that’s simply not the case.
While there is a question of how faithful the meditator is to SCIENTIA STAN-
DARDS, that concern does not revolve around whether the meditator fails
to do so because she has EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC DESIRE. Rather, it is about
the scope of hyperbolic doubt, and whether Descartes sneaks anything in
through the back door. There is no commentator (that I know of) who ar-
gues that the meditator initially desires scientia about everything in the face
of skepticism, and that her purported task is to transform a pre-theoretical
body of (allegedly) false beliefs into a systematic body of genuine scientia.
Once we see that EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC DESIRE cannot be attributed
to the meditator, we can then recognize that Shapiro’s account of the me-
diator’s laughter at the end of the Sixth Meditation is equally, if not more
problematic. Recall, Shapiro states that the meditator does not really defeat
the skepticism of the First Meditation:
At the end of the Meditations the meditator admits that he does
go wrong about many things; indeed, he recognizes that he is
susceptible to ‘true errors of nature’ and that ‘the nature of man
as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to
mislead him from time to time’. Surely, so long as he is prone to
these sorts of errors, error which are in principle unavoidable,
he has not banished the specter of his skepticism. At the begin-
ning of the Meditations it is just this possibility that he might go
wrong unwittingly by his nature that leads him to despair.
Yet at the end of the work, the possibility of such mistakes no
longer leaves the meditator in such a desperate state. One might
say that his thoughts about the weakness of his own nature are
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no longer invested with the same passions. What once made him
fearful now makes him laugh; he feels differently about things.
(2005: 25)
One can see clearly here why Shapiro claims that the passions are epis-
temically significant to the Meditations. It is because the meditator does
not really defeat skepticism through any rational argumentation. As such,
the meditator is still susceptible to the dread and fear she experienced at
the end of the First Meditation. The only way of continuing forward is to
change how she feels about skeptical scenarios, which is ultimately a mat-
ter of a change in her desire for knowledge (vis-à-vis a new understanding
of self afforded to her by generosity).
But on any standard and plausible reading of what Descartes is doing,
it is clear that he does think that he defeats skepticism through, in part, the
acquisition of metaphysical knowledge. Indeed, in trying to find a role for
the meditator’s passions, Shapiro implicitly undermines the entire stated
project of the Meditations.
Allow me to explain. There are two theodicies in the Meditations: the
epistemic theodicy of the Fourth Meditation, and the sensory theodicy of the
Sixth Meditation. In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes’ task is to show that
God does not deceive us about theoretical matters, that is, he is not the
source of any of our false theoretical judgments. Descartes’ solution is to
say that, although false judgments do obtain, their real source lies in us,
not God. The privation of false judgments arises because of the disparity
between the scopes of the intellect and will. This is standard fare.
But in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes is concerned with a different
problem of deception: namely, a kind of deception in the senses that harms
the mind-body composite. Consider dropsy-style cases. Dropsy is a token
sensation that misleads a subject, S, in a way such that she is liable to harm
her health and survival. For in dropsy S feel thirsty when drinking would
be harmful, and there are no internal phenomenal cues to detect that one
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is not in normal circumstances. The reason why this is problematic, the
thought goes, is because Descartes claims that God gave us sensations—the
best of all possible sensations—which have the biological function of pre-
serving our health (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 87-8/CSM II: 60). Yet dropsy
does not fulfill that function at all.
Descartes’ response here is both subtle and understudied. In this con-
text, I cannot fully lay out the sensory theodicy. But the strategy, in prin-
ciple, will be the same as the Fourth Meditation. According to Descartes,
when sensations are considered at the type-level, we must admit that God
gave us the best of all possible sensation types. But when considered at the
token-level—as instantiated in finite mind-body composites—it is possible
that a token sensation can be harmful to the mind-body composite. But this
does not obtain due to any malicious intention on the part of God. Rather, it
arises due to the finite and therefore imperfect institution of nature between
brain impressions and sensations. An aberrant motion in the body can lead
us to form a brain impression that, although normally corresponds to a
health-conducive sensation, now gives rise to a harmful sensation (Sixth
Meditation AT VII: 88-9/CSM II: 61). As such, the source of the error in
dropsy is not God; rather, its possibility is inevitable because of the finitude
of the mind-body composite.
What this shows is that Shapiro’s claim that dropsy-style cases regen-
erates skeptical scenarios is misplaced (and by saying that certain sensory
errors are inevitable due to our design, it comes dangerously close to im-
plying that Descartes never really rules out that God is a deceiver). But
Descartes does have a response. Yes, mind-body composites can undergo
dropsy. But God, being benevolent and non-deceptive, has given the mind-
body composite epistemic and cognitive tools to detect when its sensory
system is functioning normally, and when it is not.
The error in dropsy-style cases is two-fold. First, in dropsy, the thirst
sensation tells the mind-body composite that it needs to drink. As such,
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there is a kind of misleading evidence. Then, based on that evidence, the
mind-body composite falsely judges that it needs to drink. While the first
kind of error is in some sense unavoidable, it is still due to our finite na-
ture (not God’s intended design). But more importantly, the second error is
avoidable, for once the mind-body composite learns that she has such an af-
fliction, armed with the TRUTH RULE (more below) she can be more careful
about what judgments she makes based on her thirst sensations. The real
error—i.e. falsity in judgments—is avoidable. As such, the laughter at the
end of the Sixth Meditation is a symptom of the meditator’s epistemological
and metaphysical accomplishments. She now knows that God exists and
is not a deceiver, which implies that ‘it would therefore be a contradiction
that anything should be created by him which positively tends toward false-
hood’ (Second Replies, AT VII: 144/CSM II: 103; emphasis added). Once she
realized this, engaging skeptical scenarios is a laughable affair.
2.2 The Method of Doubt and the Passions
According to Shapiro, part of the reason why the presence of the pas-
sions poses a challenge for RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY is that the passions
have—in part—physiological origins. As such, the presence of the passions
in the Meditations may call us to challenge the standard view of a disem-
bodied meditator who relies on the intellect alone:
If the meditator were the disembodied thinking thing that Descartes’
dualism seems to suggest is possible, then he should not be feel-
ing any passions at all. (2005: 20; see also 23)
It is important that we consider this possibility. All I have shown, up until
now, is that the meditator’s passions do not undergo the regulation that
Shapiro envisions. Nonetheless, I have left open that the meditator does
experience passions, which still raises concerns for the metaphysics and
epistemology of the Meditations.
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However, I think this question is a bit misguided. One first needs to settle
on Descartes’ method in the Meditations, as well as the scope of Descartes’
doubt, before asking why he offers descriptions of the passions. Without
independent evidence, it is a backward explanatory order to take passing
references to the meditator’s passions as indicating (or even seeming to
indicate) fundamental epistemological commitments, and to then re-read
Descartes’ entire epistemology. Descartes’ epistemology is not only laid out
in the Meditations, but throughout much of Descartes’ work: the Discourse
on Method, the Principles of Philosophy, and the Objections and Replies.
We have a good sense of his epistemology. If we seek a textually based
and systematic interpretation of the meditator’s passions, we first need to
be clear about Descartes’ fundamental epistemological commitments, and
then think about how those commitments are expressed and conveyed to
the confused meditator.
I am not here to lay out what I take to be canonical Cartesian episte-
mology. But here are two important epistemological assumptions:
1. The scope of the doubt in the First Meditation is fully hyperbolic.
2. The ultimate source of scientia is clear and distinct perception, and the
method for acquiring scientia is established by the Fifth Meditation.
What assumptions (1) and (2) entail is that, in the context of the Medi-
tations, there is absolutely no kind of mental state—other than clear and
distinct perceptions—that can serve as grounds for scientia. That is not to
say that other mental states are not ultimately important in the life of the
Cartesian mind, once the Meditations is completed. But the task of the Med-
itations is defeating hyperbolic doubt. Insofar as there is—for all intents
and purposes—an evil genius deceiving the meditator, the meditator must
suspend judgment about every kind of mental state other than clear and
distinct perception. Indeed, this is required by the Truth Rule:
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TRUTH RULE: A subject, S, should not judge that p unless S is occurrently
clearly and distinctly perceiving that p. (Third Meditation, AT VII: 35/CSM II:
24; Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 60-1/CSM II: 41)
Keeping the TRUTH RULE in mind, taking the meditator’s passions seriously
(at least epistemically seriously) generates unresolvable inconsistencies for
Descartes. Recall, the motivationalist reading claims that the function of the
passions is to motivate us to want what nature deems useful for the mind-
body composite, and to dispose the body to move in the appropriate ways
so as to attain those things. Bracketing the possibility of intellectual pas-
sions in the Meditations for now (we will consider them in section 4), the
meditator is not justified in following through with the impulses of the pas-
sions. This is ultimately because the meditator does not know that she has
a body until she is working through the Sixth Meditation. Indeed, through-
out the Meditations, the meditator is constantly resisting the thought that
her real nature consists in a corporeal thing. As such, the passions are a
hindrance, not an aid to the meditator’s epistemic progress. They must be
resisted.
Why, then, does Descartes describe the meditator’s passions while the
meditator is merely a res cogitans? Is there an inconsistency there? Here, I
think that Shapiro confuses an epistemic claim with a metaphysical claim,
which (in part) gets the whole question of PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY up
and running. Shapiro implies that RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY requires
that the meditator is disembodied:
DISEMBODIED MEDITATOR: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY is true iff the med-
itator is disembodied.
Conversely:
EMBODIED MEDITATOR: PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is true iff the meditator
is embodied.
20
Both DISEMBODIED MEDITATOR and EMBODIED MEDITATOR are false. For in
actuality the meditator is embodied. The relevant question is whether the
meditator knows this. We must distinguish, then, two claims:
METAPHYSICAL CLAIM: The meditator, in actuality, is embodied.
EPISTEMIC CLAIM: The meditator does not know whether she is embodied
until the Sixth Meditation.
Once we distinguish these claims, we can explain why the meditator experi-
ences the passions, and perhaps why Descartes references them. Skepticism
about whether the body exists in no ways suppresses passive perceptions
that the body induces. The meditator will still experience passions, for she
is—albeit unkowingly—embodied. Nonetheless, her task is to ignore the
passions and remain committed to the method of doubt.
3 Intellectual Wonder and Joy
Thus far, I have been assuming that the passions have physiological ori-
gins. That, in part, was a dialectical choice. The revisionary implications
of PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY become live only when we’re speaking of
passions that depend on the body. Indeed, almost all the passions Shapiro
catalogs do have physiological origins. However, Descartes does recognize
intellectual passions, passions that arises from purely mental, and not phys-
iological changes. As such, one might argue that intellectual passions could
contribute to the meditator’s epistemic progress, without generating any
inconsistencies with Descartes’ system. Call this WEAK PASSIONATE EPISTE-
MOLOGY.
At the end of the Third Meditation, there are two passions that are
expressed which should be read as intellectual in nature: namely, wonder
and joy. At the end of the Third Meditation, the meditator has now worked
through the cosmological argument. She now pauses to reflect:
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I should like to pause here and spend some time in the con-
templation of God; to reflect on his attributes, and to gaze with
wonder and adoration on the beauty of this immense light, so
far as the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it. For just as
we believe through faith that the supreme happiness of the next
life consists solely in the contemplation of the divine majesty,
so experience tells us that this same contemplation, albeit much
less perfect, enables us to know the greatest joy of which we are
capable in this life. (AT VII: 52/CSM II: 36)
Amy Schmitter offers the most plausible reading of what’s going on here.
Let us first examine wonder. Schmitter writes:
Wonder has a special status among the passions: it has no oppo-
site, and it involves no change in the heart or in the blood. That
is because ‘its object is not good or evil, but only knowledge of
the thing that we wonder at’. Wonder, however, is useful, as are
the other passions, for they all ‘strengthen and prolong thoughts
in the soul which it is good for the soul to preserve and which
otherwise might easily be erased from it’. But whereas the other
passions make us take note of those objects that appear good or
evil for the mind-body union, wonder can be directed at things
‘which merely appear unusual’. Indeed, wonder is useful par-
ticularly insofar as it ‘makes us learn and retain in our mem-
ory things of which we were previously ignorant’. The function
of wonder, then, is to drive us from ignorance and towards the
search for truth. Nor is its motivational force restricted to knowl-
edge that has instrumental value for our preservation as human
beings. (2002: 101)
The thought here is that meditator’s wonder is epistemically significant be-
cause it strengthens and prolongs—i.e. preserves—the meditator’s knowl-
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edge of God. Let us make this precise:
PRESERVATION THROUGH WONDER: In the right circumstances, the won-
der of a subject, S, directed at knowledge that p, is epistemically significant
because it has a preservative function: it helps S sustain occurrent awareness
of knowledge that p, and helps S retain the knowledge that p in memory.
As for joy, Schmitter writes:
Intellectual love and joy are not subject to any confusion about
their causes and effects (unlike the bodily passions), it seems
they will always motivate and signal the increasing perfection
of the thinking soul. And since knowledge, the acquisition of
truth, must count as the primary end of the activities proper
to the thinking soul, we thinkers should love knowledge. If we
pursue knowledge and are (regularly) rewarded by joy, then we
have as good evidence as we could want of our success at joining
ourselves to real knowledge, and thus of our increasing perfec-
tion. So, a constant joy in the activity of thinking is a sign of the
truth achieved thereby. Certainly, Descartes suggests time and
again that clear and distinct perceivings bring us joy in propor-
tion to their clarity and distinctness. The most dramatic avowal
of this connection appears in the Third Meditation, where the
narrator declares that the contemplation of God and of our de-
pendence on God – a contemplation of the perfection of our
soul that perfects it yet further – constitutes “the greatest joy of
which we are capable in this life.” By joining ourselves to God in
loving, devoted contemplation, we experience a joy that marks
the truth of our perceiving.
The thought here is that the meditator’s joy is epistemically significant be-
cause it is a marker that she is securing genuine knowledge. Let us make
this precise:
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JOY RULE: In the right circumstances, when a subject, S, experiences intel-
lectual joy upon acquiring some perception that p, that joy is a marker of the
truth and certainty of that perception that p, i.e. joy indicates the possession
of a knowledge that p.
These are interesting proposals. However, while in a different context Descartes
may be justified in ascribing to both PRESERVATION THROUGH WONDER and
Joy Rule, the meditator cannot do so in the Third Meditation.
On PRESERVATION THROUGH WONDER: as far as the meditator is con-
cerned, her memory may be defective. The meditator does not know that
her memory is reliable until the end of the Sixth Meditation. While wonder
may help preserve certain contents in memory, the meditator is not justified
in relying on those memory reports at this point. Indeed, wonder does not
come up anywhere else in the Meditations, and perhaps rightfully so. As
for strengthening an occurrent clear and distinct perception of God at the
end of the Third Meditation, it is not clear how this will work. Descartes
claims that clear and distinct perceptions are fleeting synchronic events. And
nowhere else does he claim that wonder can help us sustain a clear and dis-
tinct perception. Perhaps wonder can strengthen and prolong some kinds
of mental states; but in a state of clear and distinct perception, it is exclu-
sively the intellect that is engaged. Indeed, it is not even clear if the wonder
directed at the idea of God is of a clear and distinct perception of God or
the memory of the clear and distinct perception of God’s existence.6
On the JOY RULE: The JOY RULE is epistemically dependent on the
TRUTH RULE. However, in the Third Meditation the TRUTH RULE has yet to
be established, even though it is entertained at the beginning of this medi-
tation. It would be highly revisionary—and plainly false—to claim that the
meditator’s initial guide to truth and certainty is whether she experiences
intellectual joy while having a clear and distinct perception.
Again, this is not to say that PRESERVATION THROUGH WONDER and the
6citations
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THE JOY RULE may be epistemically significant in other contexts after one
has completed the Meditations. But in the context of the Meditations they
simply cannot be doing any real work. WEAK PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is
false.
4 The Passions and Self-Knowledge
I submit that PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is false. But matters are compli-
cated. As stipulated, PASSIONATE EPISTEMOLOGY is supposed to figure into
the foundational epistemological and metaphysical work of the Meditations.
Our task was to see whether acquiring scientia requires the meditator to
have both her thoughts and feelings in order. While that is not the case, it
is certainly true that post-Meditations, the regulation of the passions is epis-
temically significant in practical matters, and is relevant to the acquisition
of a certain kind of self-knowledge. As Shapiro writes:
Part of knowing, for Descartes, is knowing who one is, and this
self-knowledge essentially involves feeling a certain way toward
oneself. This feeling of the passion of generosity, in turn informs
one’s other thoughts. So, on this reading of the place of the pas-
sions in the Meditations, epistemology is not to be divorced from
one’s affective life. Knowledge involves self-knowledge, which
is emotionally laden. Knowing involves not only having one’s
thoughts in order, but also having one’s feelings in order. (2005:
30).
Shapiro is on to something crucial here. However, I would modulate this
claim by saying that moral (not theoretical) knowledge requires having
one’s feelings in order. As Descartes tells us in his account of the gener-
ous person, the generous person understands that the only thing that truly
belongs to her is the freedom to dispose of her volitions. She understands
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her-self as a res volans (Brown 2006, Mihali 2011, Parvizian 2016). Un-
derstanding that a (virtuous) will is the only grounds for self-esteem is
an epistemological achievement that requires—in part—a regulation of the
passions. But that self-knowledge can only be attained once (amongst other
things) the Meditations is dispassionately completed.
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